Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case came before the Supreme Court on appeal from a jury verdict entered in a wrongful death case in favor of Jose Aguilar, Guadalupe Aguilar, Alejandro Aguilar, Lorena Aguilar and Jose Aguilar, Jr. (collectively, "the Aguilars") against Dr. Nathan Coonrod, his employer Primary Health Care Center (Primary Health) and employees of Primary Health. On appeal Dr. Coonrod asserted that the district court abused its discretion in barring him from questioning the Aguilars' expert about his opinion as to the professional negligence of Dr. Chai and Dr. Long (two previous defendants who settled or were dismissed prior to trial) in their treatment of the decedent Maria Aguilar either on cross-examination or during his case in chief. Dr. Coonrod alleged that the district court also abused its discretion in forbidding him to read portions of Dr. Blaylock’s deposition into the record. Finally, Dr. Coonrod alleged that the district court erred in interpreting the statutory cap on non-economic damages as applying to each of the Aguilars individually instead of collectively. Upon review, the Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Dr. Coonrod's motion for a new trial, finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in barring Dr. Coonrod from questioning the expert on the issue of the purported negligence of Drs. Chai and Long. Dr. Coonrod failed to properly disclose Dr. Blaylock as an expert he intended to call, and was thus barred from calling him during his case in chief. Furthermore, the Court held that the district court correctly found that the statutory limitation on noneconomic damages applied on a per claimant basis, rather than a per claim basis. View "Aguilar, Jr. v. Coonrod" on Justia Law

Cassie Jo Stoddart was murdered in 2006. Defendant Brian Draper, who was sixteen years-old at the time of Stoddart’s murder, and Torey Adamcik, also a juvenile, were arrested and charged with murder and conspiracy to commit murder. Both were tried as adults, and convicted during separate trials. Defendant was sentenced to a term of fixed life imprisonment for the murder charge and a life sentence with thirty years fixed for the conspiracy charge. Defendant raised seven issues on appeal: 1) the jury instructions for both murder and conspiracy relieved the State of proving all elements of the crimes and violated his right to due process of law; 2) his fourth police interview should have been suppressed as his parents were not present at the interview; 3) the jury instructions and the district court’s failure to suppress the interview, even if individually harmless, cumulatively constitute reversible error; 4) the sentences should be vacated because the investigator’s presentence report was biased; 5) Defendant's fixed life sentence for murder violated the Idaho and U.S. Constitutions’ prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment; 6) the district court’s sentences constituted an abuse of discretion; and 7) the district court’s denial of Defendant's motion under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 to modify his sentences constituted an abuse of discretion. Upon review of the trial court's record, the Supreme Court only found error in the jury instruction pertaining to Defendant's conspiracy charge, but affirmed the trial court in all other respects. The Court vacated Defendant's conviction on conspiracy to commit first degree murder and remanded the case for a new trial on that charge. View "Idaho v. Draper " on Justia Law

Do Nguyen, Jana Nguyen, Kenny Nguyen and John Doe’s (collectively "the Nguyens") appealed a district court's grant of a motion to set aside a default judgment in favor of Janice Maynard. On appeal, Maynard contended that the district court abused its discretion in setting aside its previously entered default judgment. In 2006, Maynard filled out an application to rent a trailer home from the Nguyens and reached an agreement with the Nguyens under which Maynard would receive title to the home if she paid $500 in rent each month for a period of three years. In 2008, Maynard reported to the Ada County Jail to serve a sentence, and when she returned home on November 27, 2008, she discovered that the Nguyens had removed her belongings from the trailer home and rented the trailer to other tenants. In 2009, an evidentiary hearing was held on the issue of damages. At the beginning of that hearing Maynard’s attorney told the court that he had received a two-page letter on June 29, 2009, which was addressed to "[counsel for Maynard], Janice Maynard and To Whom it May Concern." Counsel asked whether the court had received that letter, and described various documents which were attached to it. When the court said that it had not received the letter, the attorney offered no further information concerning the letter’s contents, but proceeded to present evidence concerning damages. The district court entered a default judgment against the Nguyens in the amount of $3,265 in actual damages and an enhanced penalty of $15,000 for the ICPA violation. The Nguyens filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. The Nguyens noted that they had sent Maynard’s attorney a letter explaining their version of events and why they believed that Maynard had abandoned the trailer home. On December 7, 2009, the district court granted the Nguyens’ motion to set aside the default judgment, finding that the Nguyens had demonstrated that there were unique and compelling circumstances justifying relief. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order setting aside the default judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Maynard v. Nguyen" on Justia Law

This case arose from Defendant Diego Morales Peregrina’s conviction on two counts of aggravated battery and two firearm enhancements; one for each battery. Peregrina argued on appeal of his sentence that there was insufficient evidence to support the district court’s "implicit" finding that the crimes arose out of divisible courses of conduct, and that even if there was, the State had the burden to submit the issue of divisibility to the jury and prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that no instruction was requested by either Peregrina or the State regarding I.C. 19-2520E, which states that when two crimes "arise out of the same indivisible course of conduct," the defendant "may only be subject to one (1) enhanced penalty." The district court sentenced Peregrina as follows: ten years fixed for the first count of aggravated battery; ten years fixed for the second count of aggravated battery consecutive to the first count; ten years indeterminate enhancing the sentence in the first count; and ten years indeterminate enhancing the sentence in the second count, both consecutive to the previous counts. Peregrina was also sentenced to five years fixed for his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm, to run concurrent with the other sentences, with credit for two hundred days served. The Supreme Court found that the State's failure to submit the issue of divisibility to the jury and to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings. View "Idaho v. Peregrina " on Justia Law

Defendant AIA Services Corporation entered into a stock redemption agreement with Appellant Reed Taylor to purchase all of his shares in AIA Services for a $1.5 million down payment promissory note and a $6 million promissory note, plus other consideration. When AIA failed to pay the $1.5 million when it became due, Appellant and AIA agreed to modify the stock redemption agreement. AIA was a still unable to make payments under the new terms. Appellant then filed suit to recover the amounts owed on the two promissory notes. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of AIA and dismissed six of Appellant's causes of action after finding the revised stock redemption agreement was unenforceable. On appeal, Appellant argued the redemption agreement complied with state law and was still enforceable. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's holding that the agreement was illegal and unenforceable and affirmed the court's dismissal of Appellant's six causes of action. View "Reed J. Taylor v. AIA Services " on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher Flegel was indicted by a grand jury for lewd conduct with a child under sixteen in violation of Idaho Code section 18-1508. Defendant pled not guilty and was tried by a jury. The district court instructed the jury regarding the crime of Lewd Conduct and, as an included offense, the crime of sexual abuse of a child under sixteen years of age. The jury found Defendant not guilty of Lewd Conduct, but could not reach a verdict on the Sexual Abuse charge. Without resubmitting the matter to a grand jury, the State filed an amended indictment charging Defendant with Sexual Abuse. Defendant was tried by a jury on that charge and found guilty, to which he appealed. The appeal was initially heard by the Idaho Court of Appeals. It held that the indictment was properly amended because evidence admitted during Defendant's first trial supported the included offense of Sexual Abuse; and that the district court erred in failing to tailor the jury instruction on Sexual Abuse to eliminate the risk that the jury in the second trial would find Defendant guilty of conduct for which he was acquitted in the first trial. Because it concluded that such error was not harmless, the Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that because the Sexual Abuse crime had not been submitted to the grand jury and was not an included offense of the crime of lewd conduct charged in the original indictment, the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. The Court therefore vacated the judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss without prejudice. View "Idaho v. Flegel " on Justia Law

Claimant Patrick Williams appealed the Industrial Commission's determination that I.C. 72-802 does not prohibit Respondent Blue cross of Idaho from seeking to exercise its contractual right of subrogation against his lump sum settlement proceeds. Claimant's insurance contract with Blue Cross contained several subrogation and reimbursement provisions. In addition to seeking payment from Blue Cross, Williams filed a complaint with the Industrial Commission seeking workers’ compensation for the medical expenses incurred as a result of two shoulder surgeries, as well as benefits for temporary and permanent disability as a result of such injuries. Claimant entered into a lump sum settlement agreement with the State Insurance Fund. After the agreement was finalized before the Commission, Blue Cross sent a letter to counsel for Williams demanding that, pursuant to Blue Cross’ right of subrogation, he withhold money from the workers’ compensation proceeds for payment to Blue Cross. The Commission ultimately concluded that I.C. 72-802 did not prohibit Blue Cross from seeking to exercise a contractual right of subrogation because Blue Cross is a subrogee, and not a creditor, within the meaning of the statute. However, the Commission found it did not have jurisdiction to consider a breach of contract claim by Blue Cross against Williams and, therefore, determined that Blue Cross must pursue its remedy in district court. Upon review of the applicable legal authority and the Commission's record, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s determination that Blue Cross was a subrogee under I.C. 72-802. View "Williams v. Blue Cross of Idaho " on Justia Law

Claimant Floyd Fife appealed a decision of the Industrial Commission that found he had failed to prove that his medical condition requiring back surgery was caused by an industrial accident rather than by pre-existing degenerative changes in his thoracic and lumbar spine. An evidentiary hearing was held before a hearing officer on November 5, 2009, but the hearing officer left the employment of the Industrial Commission before submitting proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Commission then reviewed the record and issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order on June 8, 2010. It found the testimony of Claimant’s surgeon unpersuasive, characterizing it as "unclear, to the point of opacity, as to the actual nature of the injury which he claims is responsible for the need for surgery." When the surgeon had been asked whether he could point to any objective pathological findings in any of the diagnostic studies he had performed on Claimant that related to recent trauma, the surgeon answered that he could not. The Commission found convincing the testimony of the physician who conducted the independent medical examination of Claimant. On appeal, Claimant contended that the Commission erred as a matter of law in rejecting the testimony of his surgeon. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because the Commission, as the trier of fact, was not required to accept the testimony of Claimant’s treating physician, the Court affirmed its decision. View "Fife v. The Home Depot " on Justia Law

Jane and John Doe appealed a trial court's order that terminated their parental rights to Jane's four and John's two children on the grounds of neglect and in the best interests of the children. The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare filed a petition to terminate the parties' parental rights due to the parents' failure to address substance abuse issues, home sanitation issues, their failure to maintain adequate income and their failure to keep the children safe. Upon review, the Supreme Court found substantive and competent evidence to support the trial court's decision. The Court affirmed the trial court's order terminating Jane and John Doe's parental rights. View "In re termination of the parental rights of Jane & John Doe" on Justia Law

After conducting an informal custody trial and granting the parties' divorce, a magistrate judge awarded the parties joint legal custody of their two minor children. Primary physical custody was awarded to their father Respondent Jimmy Schneider, subject to visitation rights awarded to their mother, Appellant Dorothy Schneider. Mrs. Schneider appealed that decision arguing that the magistrate judge's findings that her use of medications affected her ability to parent. Furthermore, Mrs. Schneider argued the magistrate abused its discretion in ordering visitation for Mrs. Schneider on certain mornings in the father's home. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate judge's decisions. The Court affirmed the magistrate's award of primary physical custody to the father. However, the Court found the magistrate judge abused its discretion in granting Mrs. Schneider the right to care for the children in the father's home on certain mornings. The Court remanded the case back to the magistrate level for further proceedings on reasonable visitation. View "Schneider v. Schneider" on Justia Law