Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Mark Radford and the State Board of Land Commissioners and the Idaho Department of Lands (collectively, "the State") were involved in a contract dispute over the State's easement on Radford's property. The State used the easement to access and manage state endowment lands leased for grazing. Historically, the State accessed the easement through the Hallo Property, which Radford purchased in 2020, subsequently revoking the State's access. Radford claimed that an email from the State indicated the easement was no longer needed, leading him to file a lawsuit alleging the State breached the termination clause of the easement agreement by not providing a statement confirming termination.The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of Idaho granted summary judgment in favor of the State, determining that the termination clause gave the State sole and subjective power to decide whether the easement was necessary. The court found that the State had not made any determination that the easement was no longer needed, thus dismissing Radford's breach of contract claim. Radford appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the State had no contractual duty to assess whether the easement was necessary for its granted purposes. The agreement's termination clause did not impose an obligation on the State to periodically reassess the easement's necessity. The court also rejected Radford's argument that the State's refusal to terminate the easement violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as the State had not determined the easement was no longer needed. The court awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal to the State, concluding that Radford's appeal was unreasonably pursued. View "Radford v. Van Orden" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers stopped John Michael Sherwood for a suspected violation of Idaho Code section 49-456 because the Rhode Island license plate on the car he was driving was registered to a different vehicle. During the stop, a deputy discovered over 100 pounds of marijuana, leading to Sherwood's arrest for trafficking in marijuana. Sherwood moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the stop was illegal as his license plate complied with Rhode Island law. The district court denied the motion. Sherwood also moved to dismiss the case, claiming his speedy trial rights were violated due to delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The district court denied this motion as well, citing the pandemic and related orders as good cause for the delay. A jury found Sherwood guilty of trafficking in marijuana.Sherwood appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, arguing that Idaho Code section 49-456 only applies to vehicles registered in Idaho and that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss without evaluating the factors in Idaho Criminal Rule 28. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the plain language of Idaho Code section 49-456 applies to all vehicles driven in Idaho, regardless of where they are registered, and affirmed the district court's denial of Sherwood's motion to suppress. The court also held that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted good cause for the delay in Sherwood's trial, affirming the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Sherwood's judgment of conviction. View "State v. Sherwood" on Justia Law

South Hill Meat Lockers Incorporated (South Hill) alleged that the Idaho Transportation Department (ITD) caused damage to its building during a road construction project on U.S. Highway 95 in Bonners Ferry, Idaho. South Hill claimed ITD was liable under seven different causes of action, including negligence and constitutional violations. ITD moved for summary judgment, asserting "plan or design immunity" under Idaho Code section 6-904(7). The district court initially denied ITD's first motion for summary judgment but later granted ITD's second motion for partial summary judgment, dismissing four of South Hill's claims. After a change in judges, the new judge granted ITD's motion for reconsideration, dismissing South Hill's complaint with prejudice.The district court's rulings were mixed. Judge Buchanan initially denied ITD's first motion for summary judgment, finding genuine disputes of material fact. However, she later granted ITD's second motion for partial summary judgment, dismissing several of South Hill's claims. Upon Judge Buchanan's retirement, Judge Berecz reconsidered and granted ITD's first motion for summary judgment, dismissing all of South Hill's claims.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case and vacated the district court's judgment. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's summary judgment rulings. The Supreme Court found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether ITD's change orders and the gas line relocation were meaningfully reviewed, which precluded summary judgment on the basis of plan or design immunity. The court also reversed the dismissal of South Hill's nuisance claim, holding that a nuisance claim for damages can persist even after the nuisance has abated. The court affirmed the district court's rulings on other claims, including the determination that Idaho Code section 55-310 does not impose strict liability. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "South Hill Meat Lockers Incorp. v. Idaho Transportation Dept." on Justia Law

Amanda Fletcher was arrested after a police officer, Officer Biagi, noticed her vehicle parked outside a convenience store and discovered she had a warrant for her arrest. Upon arresting her, Biagi requested a drug detection dog to sniff the exterior of her vehicle. The dog alerted to the presence of drugs, leading officers to search the vehicle and find methamphetamine and paraphernalia. Fletcher, who was on probation and had waived her Fourth Amendment rights, moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the Idaho Constitution provides greater protection against dog sniffs and searches than the Fourth Amendment.The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho denied Fletcher's motion to suppress, citing her probation agreement, which included a waiver of her rights concerning searches. Fletcher entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of her motion. She was sentenced to seven years with two years fixed, but her sentence was suspended, and she was placed on probation for seven years. Fletcher then appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that exterior sniffs of a vehicle by a drug dog are not considered searches under Article 1, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution. Additionally, the court found that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement does not impose a heightened standard under the Idaho Constitution. The court concluded that the officers had probable cause to search Fletcher's vehicle based on the drug dog's alert, which was sufficient to establish probable cause for a warrantless search. Thus, the district court's order denying Fletcher's motion to suppress was affirmed. View "State v. Fletcher" on Justia Law

On January 22, 2021, officers from the Coeur d’Alene Police Department were patrolling the downtown bar district when they observed James Mark Popp sitting in a parked car and flicking cigarette ash out the window. The officers approached Popp, requested his identification, and subsequently conducted a search after a drug-sniffing dog alerted to the presence of controlled substances. The search revealed cocaine, leading to Popp’s arrest and charges for possession of cocaine, possession of drug paraphernalia, and littering.The District Court of the First Judicial District of Idaho denied Popp’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the search, ruling that the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain Popp for littering under local and state laws. Popp entered a conditional guilty plea to the possession charge, preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, agreeing that the officers had reasonable suspicion under Idaho Code section 18-7031.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and concluded that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Popp under Idaho Code section 18-7031. The court found that the officers’ observation of Popp flicking cigarette ash in a private parking lot did not constitute reasonable suspicion of littering, as there was no evidence that the property owner prohibited such conduct. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s order denying the motion to suppress, vacated Popp’s judgment of conviction, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Popp" on Justia Law

Dwayne Edward Best was convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, trafficking a controlled substance, and unlawful possession of a firearm. Best moved to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search of his room, arguing it violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied the motion, and the case proceeded to a jury trial. Before closing arguments, the State moved to preclude Best from discussing the lack of law enforcement body camera footage for a particular interview, which the district court granted. The jury found Best guilty on all charges, and he filed a timely appeal challenging the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress and its decision limiting his closing argument.The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision. Best then filed a petition for review, which the Idaho Supreme Court granted. The Supreme Court reviewed whether Best preserved his suppression arguments for appeal and whether the district court erred by limiting his closing argument. The court held that Best failed to preserve his argument regarding the 2018 Terms and Conditions of Probation because he did not raise it before the district court. Additionally, the court found that Best’s alternative argument about the scope of the search was also not preserved for appeal.The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision denying Best’s motion to suppress, as the search was permitted by the 2018 Terms and Conditions of Probation. The court also held that the district court erred in precluding Best from discussing the lack of body camera footage during his closing argument but concluded that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court found substantial evidence of Best’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, excluding the erroneously precluded closing argument. Consequently, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Best’s judgment of conviction. View "State v. Best" on Justia Law

Vernon K. Smith, Jr. was declared a vexatious litigant by the Fourth District Administrative District Judge (ADJ) in Idaho. This order prevents Smith from filing new litigation pro se in Idaho courts without obtaining prior permission from a judge. The determination arose from Smith's conduct in litigation concerning the administration of his mother Victoria H. Smith’s estate. Smith, a former attorney, was involved in contentious probate proceedings after his brother successfully challenged their mother's will, which had left the entire estate to Smith. The estate was subsequently administered as intestate, leading to multiple appeals and disciplinary actions against Smith by the Idaho State Bar.The district court found that Smith repeatedly filed frivolous and unmeritorious motions, including petitions to remove the personal representative (PR) and the PR’s counsel, motions to disqualify the district court judge, and objections to court orders. These actions were deemed to lack legal or factual basis and were intended to cause unnecessary delay. The PR of the estate moved to have Smith declared a vexatious litigant under Idaho Court Administrative Rule 59(d)(3), which the district court supported, leading to the referral to the ADJ.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the ADJ’s decision. The court held that the ADJ did not abuse its discretion in declaring Smith a vexatious litigant. The ADJ acted within the legal standards set forth in Rule 59(d) and reached its decision through an exercise of reason. The court also found that Smith’s due process argument was not preserved for appeal as it was raised for the first time. The court declined to award attorney fees to the ADJ, concluding that Smith’s appeal, although unsuccessful, was not frivolous or unreasonable. View "Smith v. Hippler" on Justia Law

Nicholas Roddy Ramlow and Amanda Marie Mitchell share custody of their minor son. The magistrate court had jurisdiction over their child custody case since 2016. In 2020, a temporary order was issued for the child to attend Kindergarten at Winton Elementary in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. The parents later entered into a custody agreement that did not specify the child's school. In 2021, Mitchell moved to Pinehurst, Idaho, and enrolled the child in Pinehurst Elementary without informing Ramlow, who was under a no-contact order. Ramlow discovered the change in 2023 and attempted to enroll the child in Bryan Elementary in Coeur d'Alene, but the school secretary, Miriam McBenge, refused without both parents' consent or a court order.Ramlow filed a petition for declaratory judgment and a writ of mandamus in the district court to allow the child's enrollment in Coeur d'Alene. The district court dismissed the petition under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(8), citing the ongoing child custody case in the magistrate court. Ramlow argued that the district court erred in its dismissal. McBenge and Mitchell requested the district court's decision be affirmed.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, agreeing that the magistrate court was better positioned to resolve the issue of the child's school enrollment due to its ongoing jurisdiction over the custody case. The court noted that the district court acted within its discretion and followed the appropriate legal standards. The case was remanded to the district court to amend the judgment to reflect a dismissal without prejudice. Additionally, the court awarded attorney fees on appeal to Mitchell under Idaho Code section 12-121, as Ramlow's appeal was deemed frivolous and without foundation. View "Ramlow v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Elanore Vaughan purchased a ticket and signed an online liability waiver to go tubing at Eagle Island State Park, operated by Gateway Parks, LLC. The next day, Vaughan was injured when her tube went over an embankment and crashed into a flatbed trailer housing snowmaking equipment. Vaughan sued Gateway, alleging negligence and premises liability, claiming Gateway failed to maintain the tubing hill safely and created a hazard by placing the trailer at the end of the tubing run.The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho denied Gateway's motion to dismiss Vaughan's complaint. Gateway argued that Vaughan's claims were barred by the liability waiver she signed and the Responsibilities and Liabilities of Skiers and Ski Area Operators Act. The district court found that while the Act applied, there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the placement of the snowmaking equipment. The court also concluded that the liability waiver did not preclude Vaughan's claims. Gateway then sought and was granted permission to appeal the denial of its motion for summary judgment.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The court held that the electronic liability waiver Vaughan signed precluded her claims against Gateway. The waiver explicitly acknowledged the risks of tubing, including collisions with manmade obstacles such as snowmaking equipment. The court determined that the waiver's language was broad enough to encompass Vaughan's accident and injuries. Consequently, the court directed the district court to grant summary judgment in favor of Gateway and dismiss Vaughan's complaint. The court also denied Gateway's request for attorney fees on appeal, as the gravamen of Vaughan's lawsuit was a tort, not a commercial transaction. View "Vaughan v. Gateway Park, LLC" on Justia Law

Laura Milus, on behalf of herself and her minor son, D.L.J., filed a wrongful death action against Sun Valley Company after her husband died from colliding with snowmaking equipment while skiing at Sun Valley Ski Resort. Milus claimed that Sun Valley breached its duties under Idaho Code section 6-1103(2) and (6) by not properly marking the equipment and failing to post a notice about snowmaking operations.The District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of Idaho granted summary judgment in favor of Sun Valley, concluding that the company met its duty under section 6-1103(2) by placing yellow padding on the equipment and had no duty under section 6-1103(6) because the equipment was not actively discharging snow. The court did not address Sun Valley's argument that Milus' claims were barred by section 6-1106, which states that skiers assume the risk of injury from plainly visible or marked snowmaking equipment.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and held that ski area operators are held to an ordinarily prudent person standard of care when performing duties under the Ski Area Liability Act. The court found that Milus failed to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Sun Valley met this standard with the yellow padding. However, the court also held that there was a genuine issue of material fact about whether Sun Valley posted the required notice under section 6-1103(6).Despite this, the court affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that Milus' claims were barred by section 6-1106 because Mr. Milus assumed the risk of injury from the plainly marked snowmaking equipment. The court denied Sun Valley's request for attorney fees on appeal, as both parties prevailed on some arguments. View "Milus v. Sun Valley Company" on Justia Law