Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case, Develin Johnson appealed against the district court's decision that upheld his convictions for domestic battery and false imprisonment. The key issue in the appeal was the admissibility of Johnson's previous misdemeanor conviction for petit theft under Idaho Rule of Evidence 608(b) and whether the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. Johnson argued that the district court erred in affirming the judgment of conviction because his misdemeanor conviction for theft was inadmissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence 608(b) and the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the conduct leading to Johnson's 2013 misdemeanor conviction was probative of his character for truthfulness and that the prejudicial effect of the evidence did not substantially outweigh its probative value. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

This case involved a property dispute between neighbors Robert and Debra Talburt and Miles and Leanne Millard in Idaho. The Millards sought to establish their rights to a disputed tract of land and two easements, as well as breach of contract damages for maintenance of a shared well. The Talburts countered by constructing a fence within the roadway easement, stating they were relocating the roadway easement, and locking the pump house for the shared well. The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court's judgement in favor of the Millards on their claims related to the easements and ordered the Talburts to remove the fence and cease efforts to block access to the shared well. The court also found the Talburts' attempt to relocate the roadway easement to be unlawful, invalid, and void. However, the district court found that the Millards had abandoned their breach of contract claim and failed to establish a right to the disputed property. The Supreme Court also affirmed the district court's award of a portion of the Millards' attorney fees and costs to them. View "Millard v. Talburt" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between Melissa Sanchez, a tenant, and Chris and Jennifer Pickering, her landlords, over the terms of a lease agreement for a mobile home owned by the Pickerings. Sanchez believed the agreement was a lease-to-own contract, while the Pickerings asserted it was a lease with a purchase option contract. After the Pickerings initiated an eviction action due to Sanchez's alleged violations of the agreement, Sanchez caused extensive damage to the home.The Pickerings sued Sanchez for waste, claiming she caused $40,000 in damages and sought treble damages. Sanchez counterclaimed, alleging violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act (ICPA), breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and retaliatory eviction. The district court found Sanchez liable for damages to the residence and awarded treble damages. It also determined that there was no deception on the Pickerings' part to sustain Sanchez's ICPA claim, the agreement was unenforceable due to a lack of mutual understanding, and that the Pickerings were unjustly enriched by the $10,000 down payment and offset the Pickerings' damages award by this amount. The remaining claims were dismissed.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court's decision. The court found substantial and competent evidence supporting the district court's decision that the Pickerings did not engage in a deceptive act under the ICPA. The court also rejected Sanchez's contention that the district court's damages award should have been reduced to reflect an insurance payment received by the Pickerings as Sanchez failed to provide an adequate record for review. Finally, the court upheld the district court's unjust enrichment award, finding that Sanchez had not demonstrated an abuse of discretion. The Pickerings were awarded attorney fees for having to respond to the collateral source issue. View "Pickering v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho, the appellant, Thomas Eugene Creech, appealed the district court's decision to dismiss his successive post-conviction petition as untimely under Idaho Code section 19-2719. Creech argued that his petition was timely due to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Shinn v. Ramirez, which he believed represented a triggering event that restarted the forty-two-day period for filing a petition under Idaho Code section 19-2719. Creech was convicted and sentenced to death for the first-degree murder of a fellow prisoner in 1981. He filed multiple appeals and petitions for post-conviction relief, all of which were denied. His current petition relates to his 1995 death sentence.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss Creech's successive petition as untimely. The court held that the Shinn v. Ramirez judgment did not constitute a triggering event to restart the forty-two-day period for filing a petition under Idaho Code section 19-2719. The court noted that Shinn v. Ramirez interpreted federal law and did not have any bearing on state statutes, such as Idaho Code section 19-2719. Furthermore, the court rejected Creech's argument that the alleged ineffective assistance of his initial post-conviction counsel should excuse his failure to timely raise a trial ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The court held that under existing Idaho law, ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel does not excuse a failure to raise issues that should have been reasonably known. Therefore, Creech's petition was untimely under Idaho Code section 19-2719. View "Creech v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the dismissal of a successive post-conviction petition for relief filed by Thomas Eugene Creech, an inmate sentenced to death in 1995 for the murder of fellow inmate David Jensen. The district court had dismissed Creech's petition as untimely under Idaho Code section 19-2719, which requires capital defendants to file any legal or factual challenge to the sentence or conviction that is known or reasonably should be known within forty-two days of the filing of the judgment imposing the death sentence. Creech argued that his death sentence, which was imposed by a judge without the participation of a jury, was unlawful based on the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under the U.S. Constitution and the Idaho Constitution. He also claimed that societal norms have evolved to the point where his judge-imposed death sentence is now deemed cruel and unusual punishment. However, the Supreme Court held that Creech failed to articulate a claim based on information he did not know or could not have reasonably known within the forty-two day period, thus upholding the district court's dismissal of his petition as untimely. View "Creech v. State" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho, defendant William Parsons was convicted on three felony counts of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen and one misdemeanor count of disseminating harmful material to a minor. The prosecution's case was largely based on video evidence from two interviews with the minor victim, conducted by a medical social worker at a children's evaluation service that specializes in abuse cases. The victim did not testify at the trial. On appeal, Parsons argued that the admission of the video evidence violated his Sixth Amendment rights under the Confrontation Clause, as he was not given an opportunity to confront his accuser.The court agreed with Parsons, concluding that the videos were submitted to the jury in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The court found that the primary purpose of the victim's interviews was to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to a later criminal prosecution, rather than to provide medical care. Therefore, the statements in the interviews were testimonial in nature. Since the defendant had no prior opportunity to cross-examine the victim, the court held that it was error to admit the videos at trial. The court vacated the conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its decision. View "State v. Parsons" on Justia Law

The Idaho Supreme Court upheld a conviction of a man named Troy Dale Green for various offenses, including trafficking in methamphetamine and unlawful possession of a firearm. Green appealed his conviction, arguing that the testimony of a detective who had not personally performed the extraction of data from his cellphone violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The court disagreed, ruling that the detective's testimony did not violate Green's rights because the detective had sufficient knowledge and experience to analyze the extracted data and independently conclude that the data came from Green's phone. The court also rejected Green's argument that the text messages from his phone were not properly authenticated under Idaho's rules of evidence. The court found that the detective's testimony, along with that of two other detectives, sufficiently authenticated the text messages. The court affirmed Green's conviction. View "State v. Green" on Justia Law

Two online fundraising companies, Snap! Mobile, Inc. ("Snap") and Vertical Raise, LLC ("Vertical Raise"), were involved in a dispute. Snap accused Vertical Raise and its CEO, Paul Landers, of poaching its sales representatives and customers, which violated non-compete and confidentiality provisions in the former sales representatives’ employment agreements with Snap. The trial court granted Snap a preliminary injunction to prevent further violations and partially ruled in Snap's favor on some claims. A jury trial on damages resulted in an award of $1,000,000 to Snap. However, the trial court increased the award to $2,310,021. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the trial court's award of discretionary costs for expert witness fees but reversed the trial court’s order granting an additur or new trial. The Supreme Court ordered the trial court to enter a judgment consistent with the original jury award. The Supreme Court also reversed the trial court’s decision granting Snap a permanent injunction. In a separate contempt proceeding, the Supreme Court affirmed the contempt court's decision to dismiss contempt charges against Vertical Raise and Paul Croghan, a former Snap employee. The contempt court had determined the preliminary injunction was vague, overbroad, and unenforceable. View "Snap! Mobile v. Vertical Raise" on Justia Law

This case arises from a water rights dispute in Idaho. The McConnells sought to transfer their water rights to a new point of diversion on Lee Creek. Their upstream neighbor, Whittaker, protested the application, arguing that the new diversion would infringe upon his water rights. The Idaho Department of Water Resources (IDWR) approved the transfer, finding that it would not injure Whittaker's water rights. The IDWR used the historic confluence of two creeks to make this determination, asserting that if the confluence was above the McConnells’ diversion point, then Whittaker’s upstream water right was already subject to the McConnells’ senior water rights and the transfer wouldn't injure Whittaker's rights.On review, the district court disagreed with IDWR’s use of the historic confluence, instead favoring the modern confluence which was downstream of the McConnells' diversion point. This meant that the transfer would injure Whittaker's water rights.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reversed the district court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the West Springs Ditch, which altered the natural flow of the creek and created the modern confluence, was an unauthorized diversion of water. Therefore, the historic confluence should be used in the injury analysis, and the approval of the McConnells’ transfer application would not injure Whittaker’s water rights. The case was remanded for further proceedings in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision. View "Whittaker v. Idaho Department of Water Resources" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the judgment of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Washington County, in a medical malpractice action brought by Vivian Nipper against Dr. Lore Wootton, M.D., Dr. Robert Mairs, D.O., and the Weiser Memorial Hospital District. Nipper alleged that she was injured during the delivery of her child via a cesarean section when Dr. Wootton negligently cut her bladder, causing significant damage. Dr. Mairs was called to assist in repairing the injury, but Nipper alleged his efforts also fell below the standard of care.After a significant period of discovery, both Dr. Wootton and Dr. Mairs moved for summary judgment on the claims asserted against them. In response to each motion, Nipper moved for Rule 56(d) relief, requesting additional time to respond. The district court denied both requests for Rule 56(d) relief and granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Wootton and Dr. Mairs.The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denials of Rule 56(d) relief and subsequent grants of summary judgment. The Court found that Nipper failed to provide specific reasons why she could not present essential facts to oppose the summary judgment motion within the allotted timeframes. Further, the Court concluded that Nipper failed to set forth a satisfactory explanation for why, after two years, such essential evidence was not sought earlier. View "Nipper V. Wootton" on Justia Law