Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

An Idaho district court denied Jared Head’s motion to strike certain evidence supporting a restitution order. Jared and his wife, Teresa, worked as onsite managers at the Village Inn Motel in Malad City, Idaho. Following an investigation by the Oneida County Sheriff’s Office, Jared and Teresa were separately charged with grand theft. After pleading guilty to grand theft, Jared was ordered to pay $24,535.23 in restitution for allowing people to stay at the motel without paying, and for accepting rent payments that he did not relinquish to the motel owners. Relevant to this appeal, some of the State’s evidence supporting the restitution amount related to a specific hotel guest, S.G. Just before resting its case at the restitution hearing, the State disclosed that S.G. had been found incompetent to stand trial in an unrelated criminal case several months earlier. Jared then sought to strike any testimony, exhibits, and statements related to S.G., arguing the State withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). The district court denied Jared’s motion after concluding that his due process claim was moot because Brady did not apply to restitution hearings, which the district court couched as civil proceedings. Jared appealed, arguing the district court erred in applying an incorrect legal standard to deny his motion to strike. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. Head" on Justia Law

In 2019, Matt Dorsey brought an action against his father, Tom Dorsey, seeking formal accounting, dissolution, and winding up of their joint dairy operation, Dorsey Organics, LLC. The district court appointed a Special Master; the Special Master subsequently recommended to the district court that it grant partial summary judgment to Tom on Counts Four (breach of contract) and Five (constructive fraud). Without receiving a definitive ruling from the district court on the recommendations regarding the motions for summary judgment, the case then proceeded to a four-day hearing presided over by the Special Master, which resulted in the Special Master making Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The district court adopted, with almost no changes, the Special Master’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which relied upon the accounting of Tom's expert and rejected the opinions of Matt's expert. The district court then entered a judgment incorporating, with few changes, the Special Master’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The district court also denied Tom's request for attorney fees. Matt appealed, arguing: (1) the district court failed to properly review the evidence before accepting the findings of the Special Master; (2) questioned whether a court could override the terms of a contract even though the contract’s terms arguably produced an inequitable result; (3) Tom wrongfully dissociated from Dorsey Organics prior to its dissolution and the winding up of its affairs; and (4) challenged whether summary judgment was properly granted on Counts Four and Five of the Third Amended Complaint. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in failing to independently review the record before adopting the Special Master's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Accordingly, the Court vacated the district court's conclusions that relied on the Special Master's findings. The case was thus remanded for further proceedings. View "Dorsey v. Dorsey" on Justia Law

A large, dead tree near a mobile home rented by Tammy and Thomas Sankey fell and damaged the Sankeys’ vehicles, killed one of their cats and traumatized the other, and caused Tammy Sankey to experience emotional distress. Proceeding pro se, the Sankeys filed a small claims action against the owner of the mobile home park where they lived and the owner and managers of their mobile home. After losing in small claims court because they failed to prove on whose land the offending tree was located, the Sankeys filed for a trial de novo in magistrate court and paid for a land survey. The Sankeys submitted both documents attached to a joint declaration from them in opposition to motions for summary judgment filed by the owners and managers, along with a declaration from the Sankeys’ neighbor setting forth the neighbor’s lay testimony that the tree was located on the lot occupied by the Sankeys. The owners and managers of the mobile home and the mobile home park filed motions to strike the declaration from the neighbor as well as portions of the Sankeys’ declaration and the attached Record of Survey and Tree Exhibit. The magistrate court granted the motions, holding that no foundation had been laid for the Record of Survey and Tree Exhibit and that they were inadmissible hearsay. The magistrate court also struck the declaration of the neighbor because her testimony about the location of the fallen tree was not based on her personal knowledge. Without admissible evidence of who owned the land where the fallen tree was located, the magistrate court granted summary judgment in favor of the owners and managers. The magistrate court denied the Sankeys’ motion for reconsideration. The district court, sitting in its appellate capacity, affirmed the magistrate court’s decision. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court. View "Sankey v. Ivey" on Justia Law

The issue this appeal presented centered on a non-summary contempt proceeding arising out of a divorce, and former litigation in Oregon over spousal support Steven Abell owed his ex-wife Debra Abell. After a judgment of contempt was entered against him in Oregon for failure to pay support, Steven allegedly continued to refuse to pay Debra. Roughly one year later, Debra brought the underlying contempt proceeding in Idaho, charging Steven with contempt for failure to comply with the payment terms in the Oregon contempt judgment, and requesting relief from the Idaho district court, where Steven resided. The district court found Steven in willful contempt of the Oregon contempt judgment, and imposed an unconditional sanction of $5,000, making both determinations through a summary judgment procedure. Steven appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court found the sanction imposed by the district court was criminal in nature, and it was imposed in error because Steven was not afforded certain protections owed an alleged contemnor in a criminal contempt proceeding. In addition, regardless of whether a civil or criminal sanction is sought or imposed, when an alleged contemnor is not in default and denies the charge of contempt, the non-summary contempt proceeding cannot be adjudicated through a summary judgment procedure. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 75 requires a trial. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment of contempt was vacated, its decisions underlying its judgment were also vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings that had to start over, at the initial pleading stage, in order to proceed appropriately. View "Abell v. Abell" on Justia Law

This consolidated appeal arose from a dispute regarding a purchase option within a lease agreement. Bronco Elite Arts & Athletics, LLC, and its manager and registered agent, Brandon Paine (collectively “Bronco Elite”), operated a gymnastics facility in Garden City, Idaho. The gymnastics facility was located on property that Bronco Elite leased from 106 Garden City, LLC (“106 Garden City”), and Tricon Properties, LLC (“Tricon”). The lease agreement provided Bronco Elite the option to purchase the Property five years into the initial ten-year lease term. However, when Bronco Elite attempted to exercise its option, 106 Garden City and Tricon refused to honor the option. Bronco Elite sued 106 Garden City and Tricon, seeking specific performance. 106 Garden City and Tricon argued that Bronco Elite was precluded from exercising its purchase option because Bronco Elite had breached the lease agreement by consistently failing to pay rent on time and the lease terms only permitted Bronco Elite to exercise the purchase option if it was not in breach. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Bronco Elite and ordered 106 Garden City and Tricon to convey the Property to Bronco Elite. The specific performance ordered by the district court was stayed pending appeal. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Bronco Elite, however, the Court found the trial court erred in setting the purchase price of the Property in the way that it did. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Bronco Elite Arts & Athletics, LLC v. 106 Garden City, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2019, Officer Pallas was off duty and not in uniform when he noticed defendant-respondent Jonathan Bell at an Albertsons grocery store in Hailey, Idaho. Bell appeared to be unsteady on his feet, was having difficulty walking, and appeared confused. As Pallas watched Bell get into the driver’s seat of his vehicle and begin to drive, he called Officer Murphy, who was Pallas’ training officer and on duty, to report Bell as possibly driving under the influence. Murphy told Pallas to call dispatch, which he did. Pallas gave dispatch a description of the vehicle, the license plate number, and reported that the driver appeared to be intoxicated. The issue this case presented for the Idaho Supreme Court's review centered on the scope of its holding in Idaho v. Clarke, 446 P.3d 451 (2019). There, the Court held that an individual could not be arrested without a warrant for a misdemeanor that was completed outside the arresting officer’s presence. The State of Idaho argued that the “in the presence of the arresting officer” requirement under Clarke could be satisfied by the collective knowledge of more than one officer to establish probable cause. Thus, though the arresting officer here did not witness Bell’s driving pattern for the DUI, the State argued he had sufficient “collective knowledge” from others to carry out the arrest. The magistrate court agreed with this position below and denied Bell’s motion to suppress. However, Bell appealed to the district court, which reversed the magistrate court’s decision, concluding that the Idaho Constitution prohibited a police officer from making a warrantless arrest for a DUI committed outside the officer’s presence, even if the officer had probable cause for that offense through his collective knowledge from another officer. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. View "Idaho v. Bell" on Justia Law

Ponderay Police Department Officer Michael Watkins injured his knee while chasing a suspect. Because Watkins was injured during the performance of his duties as a police officer, he was eligible to receive his full base salary during the period of his disability under the Peace Officer and Detention Officer Temporary Disability Act. Rather than receive payments under the Act, Watkins accepted worker’s compensation benefits from the Idaho State Insurance Fund. Nearly a year later, Watkins filed a complaint against the City of Ponderay seeking payment of his full base salary. The Commission fashioned a remedy which required the City to pay Watkins his full base salary, but reduced that amount by the worker’s compensation payments Watkins had already received. Watkins appealed, arguing the Commission failed to follow the Act and exceeded its authority by ordering that the City receive a credit for benefits Watkins received. Finding the Commission erred in ordering the City receive a credit for the worker's compensation benefits, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed. View "Watkins v. City of Ponderay" on Justia Law

The Day family and Trust B of the Donald M. Day and Marjorie D. Day Family Trust appealed a district court’s decision to grant the Idaho Transportation Department’s (“ITD”) motion for involuntary dismissal. ITD cross-appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying its request for attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-120(3). In 1961, the Days learned that access to their property via public highways would be affected when the state highway converted to a controlled-access federal interstate highway, then known as Interstate 80. The Days entered into a preliminary agreement with the Idaho Department of Highways (“IDH,” predecessor to ITD) that allowed IDH to take possession of approximately nine acres of the Day Property for construction of the interstate. In 1967, the Days entered into a right-of-way contract with IDH in furtherance of the 1961 Agreement. The 1967 Contract included an agreement for IDH to provide access to a future frontage road from I-80 to the Day Property. In the 1990s, the State began construction on the Isaacs Canyon Interchange near the Day Property. The Interchange Project eliminated a portion of the original 50-foot right of way that provided access to the Day Property under the 1967 Contract. Because of this, ITD provided replacement access easements to the Day Property. These replacement access easements were located southwest of the Interstate. The Days informed ITD the family was dissatisfied with the replacement easements and did not think they afforded the Days equivalent access to what they had prior to the construction of the Interchange. The Days sold the property to Edmonds Groves Land Holdings Inc. (“Groves”) in 2005, with the purchase price secured by a mortgage held by the Day Family. Groves later defaulted in its mortgage agreement with the Days during the recession in December of 2008. As a result, ownership of the Day Property reverted to the Day Family by way of deed in lieu of foreclosure. After the Days reacquired the property, they had difficulty obtaining title insurance because of concerns that “the access easement was owned by ITD and [the Days] did not have any statement that the easement was for the benefit of the Days.” They sued alleging inverse condemnation, and breach of contract. Finding no reversible error in the district court's dismissal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Day v. Idaho Transportation Department" on Justia Law

Petitioners Idahoans for Open Primaries and Reclaim Idaho filed an original action to the Idaho Supreme Court, claiming that the Idaho Attorney General’s short and general ballot titles for “The Idaho Open Primaries Act” failed to comply with Idaho Code section 34-1809(2)(d) and (e). Petitioners asked the Supreme Court to declare the ballot titles deficient, certify Petitioners’ proposed short and general ballot titles to the Idaho Secretary of State, or in the alternative, retain jurisdiction of this matter and order the Attorney General to immediately prepare ballot titles consistent with Petitioners’ proposed titles and submit them to this Court for review. Petitioners also requested a writ of mandamus compelling the Secretary of State to extend the deadline for Petitioners to obtain signatures to qualify the initiative for placement on the 2024 general election ballot. After review, the Supreme Court granted certiorari review, holding that the short and general titles failed to substantially comply with Idaho Code section 34-1809. The Attorney General was ordered to provide revised, substantially compliant short and general ballot titles. The request for mandamus relief was denied. View "Idahoans for Open Primaries v. Labrador" on Justia Law

Tiffani Finco appealed a district court’s decision, acting in its appellate capacity, remanding a petition to modify child custody to the magistrate court for further proceedings. The Idaho Supreme Court dismissed the appeal because it was moot. View "Edmonson v. Finco" on Justia Law