Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Sean Anderson appealed his conviction and sentence for aggravated assault on a police officer. Anderson argued on appeal: (1) the district court erred by instructing the jury on a different theory of assault than what was alleged in the charging Information; (2) the district court erred by refusing to give his proposed jury instruction on the misdemeanor offense of discharge of a firearm aimed at another; and (3) the district court imposed an excessive sentence. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Anderson’s judgment of conviction, finding that the district court did not abuse its sentencing discretion. View "Idaho v. Anderson" on Justia Law

This appeal arose after a trial in which Appellant Douglas Bagby argued that a transaction between Respondents Joseph and Hilary Davis was intended to hinder, delay, or defraud Bagby in his efforts to collect on a $5 million judgment against Joseph. The district court concluded that Bagby failed to meet his burden on several causes of action arising under California’s version of the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act. Bagby appealed many of the district court’s findings and conclusions. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment dismissing Bagby’s claims. View "Bagby v. Davis" on Justia Law

Taunton Properties, LLC owned 63 townhomes and 3.8 acres of adjacent land in Eagle, Idaho. In 2020, Commercial Northwest, Taunton’s property manager and agent, provided Geringer Capital with documents regarding the property. The documents identified the townhomes as “Woodside Villas,” and included financial statements and tenant information. Geringer sent a written offer (“Offer Letter”) to Taunton Properties, proposing to purchase the 63 townhomes; the Offer Letter identified the Seller only as “Title Holder.” The Offer Letter also stated that, “Buyer and Seller agree to execute a more formal Agreement of Purchase and Sale within thirty (30) days containing market specific terms and the items set forth in this Agreement.” The Offer Letter contained sections for “Title Insurance,” “Proration’s [sic] and Closing Costs,” and “Seller’s Deliveries,” but stated those terms were “to be specified in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale.” Peter Taunton, the manager of Taunton Properties, electronically signed the Offer Letter through DocuSign, which presumably returned it to Geringer. One day after signing and returning the Offer Letter, Taunton Properties received a different purchase offer from LCA-CA I, LLC (“LCA”), with a proposed sale price that was $400,000 more than Geringer’s offer. That same day, Peter Taunton advised Geringer that Taunton Properties considered Geringer’s Offer Letter unenforceable and that Taunton Properties would be selling the properties to LCA. Geringer filed a complaint for specific performance, breach of contract, and breach of preliminary agreement against Taunton Properties. The district court granted Respondents’ motions to dismiss. The district court determined: (1) the Offer Letter lacked material terms and represented an agreement to agree; (2) the property description was insufficient under the statute of frauds; and (3) Geringer’s claims for breach of preliminary agreement, tortious interference with contract, and civil conspiracy failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted. The Idaho Supreme Court concurred with the district court: the Offer Letter failed to satisfy the statute of frauds and was so vague, uncertain, and indefinite that it was unenforceable. As a result, there was no enforceable contract with which to tortiously interfere. View "Geringer Capital v. Taunton Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

Idaho Power Company and Avista Corporation (collectively the “Companies”) contested the the Idaho State Tax Commission (the “Commission”), in its capacity as the State Board of Equalization, assessments of their operating property during 2019 and 2020, asserting that those assessments violated the proportionality and uniformity requirements set out in Article VII, sections 2 and 5 of the Idaho Constitution. The Commission rejected the Companies’ challenges and upheld its assessments. The Companies then sought judicial review of the Commission’s decision in district court, arguing that the Commission had erred in two significant ways: (1) because the Commission reduced the assessed values of certain railroads’ operating property in compliance with federal law, the assessed values of the Companies’ operating property were unconstitutionally assessed at a higher percentage of their actual cash value than were the railroads’ operating properties (the "4-R" claim); and (2) that commercial property had been assessed (and therefore taxed) at a lower percentage of its actual cash value than the Companies’ operating property, rendering the Companies’ operating property unconstitutionally disproportionally over-taxed (the "alternative claim"). The district court granted summary judgment to the Commission as to the Companies’ first argument. However, the district court concluded genuine issues of material fact existed as to the Companies’ second argument and declined to grant the Commission’s request for summary judgment. Both parties appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in dismissing the 4-R claim, but did not err as to the alternative claim. Judgment was reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Idaho Power Company v. Idaho State Tax Commission" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned a district court’s award of attorney fees to Burns Concrete, Inc., and Burns Holdings, LLC (collectively “Burns”). After extensive litigation, Burns prevailed on the merits of its claims and judgment was entered against Teton County, Idaho. The district court awarded Burns attorney fees pursuant to the parties’ development agreement. Both Burns and Teton County appealed, arguing the district court abused its discretion in awarding the fees. Burns argued the district court should have awarded more fees, while Teton County argued it should have denied the fees or awarded less fees. Finding no reversible error in the district court's award, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Burns Concrete, Inc. v. Teton County" on Justia Law

In 2018, Terri Richardson Mattson (“Mattson”) and her husband filed this action against the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, and its employee, Laurie Gallegos, a certified physician assistant (“Defendants”), alleging medical malpractice and failure to obtain informed consent related to outpatient mental health services Mattson received from Defendants. As a part of those services, Gallegos prescribed Mattson Prozac (fluoxetine), an antidepressant. Roughly one month later, the day of her follow up appointment with Gallegos, Mattson woke up, took a firearm from her gun cabinet, went to the liquor store, bought a bottle of vodka, drank the entire bottle while driving to her follow up appointment, and when she arrived in the Department’s parking lot, fired the gun into her head. Mattson survived but suffered extensive injuries. Subsequently, Mattson and her husband filed this action. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants on two grounds: (1) Defendants were immune from liability under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”) because Mattson’s claims arose out of injuries sustained while she was receiving services from a “mental health center”; and (2) the “reckless, willful and wanton conduct” exception to immunity did not apply as a matter of law. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision that Mattson’s and her husband’s claims fell within the purview of the “mental health center, hospital or similar facility” immunity provision in Idaho Code section 6-904A(2). However, the Court reversed the district court’s decision that there was no triable jury question under the “reckless, willful and wanton conduct” exception to immunity. The Supreme Court found Mattson alleged sufficient facts at summary judgment to demonstrate that a reasonable person could find that Defendants’ acts or omissions were “reckless, willful and wanton[.]” Thus, the Court vacated the judgment and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Mattson v. IDHW" on Justia Law

Defendant Stacy Ingraham appealed her convictions and sentences for possession of methamphetamine, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, destruction of evidence, and grand theft by possession of stolen property. She argued she was denied her right to a public trial under both the Idaho and U.S. constitutions, and that the district court erred by publishing a video exhibit to the jury after it began deliberations. Additionally, she contended the district court erred in allowing the jury to consider a prior felony conviction for purposes of a persistent violator enhancement where that conviction had previously been “deemed” a misdemeanor pursuant to Idaho Code section 19-2604. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed defendant's convictions, but vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "Idaho v. Ingraham" on Justia Law

Michael Reid appealed a magistrate court’s decision modifying the custody and visitation schedule involving his minor child whose custody he shared with his ex-wife, Victoria Plasse. Both parties moved to modify the prior judgment, arguing that there had been a material, substantial, and permanent change in circumstances requiring a modification of the child custody and visitation schedule. The magistrate court conducted a bench trial and determined that indeed there had been changes in circumstances requiring modification of the custody and visitation schedule. The magistrate court analyzed each of the factors listed in Idaho Code section 32-717 to determine how the schedule should be altered, and determined both parents would continue to share joint legal and physical custody of their minor child but amended the visitation schedule to minimize interactions between the parents, which had been a source of contention between them. Reid appealed the modified judgment. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate court. View "Plasse v. Reid" on Justia Law

A coalition of media companies petitioned the Idaho Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus or a writ of prohibition to vacate a nondissemination order issued by the magistrate court in the pending criminal action of State of Idaho v. Bryan C. Kohberger. The Supreme Court expedited the case and ordered briefing from the parties. The Court also granted motions to intervene filed by the two parties to this case, the State of Idaho, Latah County Prosecutor (“the State”) and the defendant, Bryan Kohberger, who were also permitted to file briefs. After review of the briefs submitted, the Supreme Court dispensed with oral argument was unnecessary to resolve this case. The underlying case involved the 2022 murder of four University of Idaho students, for which Kohberger was arrested and charged with committing. The case drew widespread publicity. Recognizing the high-profile nature of the case and the extensive coverage it has received, along with the need to minimize possible pretrial prejudice, Kohberger’s attorneys and the attorneys for the State stipulated to the nondissemination order. Shortly after the order was entered, the medial companies challenged the constitutionality of the mondissemination order and sought extraordinary relief to protect free speech rights and the media’s ability to cover the case under the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions. The Supreme Court ultimately concluded that neither a writ of mandamus nor a writ of prohibition were appropriate remedies at this time. View "Associated Press, et al. v. Second Judicial District, et al." on Justia Law

When asked about recent negative behavior, defendant-appellant Jason Roberts’ fifteen-year-old son informed his mother that she would understand if she saw the signs that Roberts “was sexually hurting” him. A Children at Risk Evaluation Services (CARES) facility interview was ultimately arranged for the child. At the beginning of the interview, the interviewer informed the child that he would speak to a nurse after the interview. Upon hearing this, the child appeared taken aback. The interviewer clarified that “they’re just going to see how tall you are and how much you weigh.” The child responded, “Okay, I thought they were going to test me for [sexually transmitted infections]. I was like, ummm.” During the CARES interview, the child detailed how Roberts had sexually abused the child starting when he was seven or eight years old. The child related that the last episode of sexual abuse occurred about two and one-half years prior to the CARES interview. While discussing the instances of sexual abuse, the child stated that after the abuse, he struggled with “suicidal stuff” that resulted in the child being “locked up.” The child indicated that after his release, he again struggled with “suicidal stuff” because the abuse continued. He admitted during the interview that he was having “a couple” thoughts about suicide, described his preferred method of self-harm, and indicated that at the time of the interview, he felt like engaging in self-harm a “little bit.” After the CARES interview, Roberts was indicted by a grand jury for two counts of lewd conduct with a minor child under age sixteen. At trial, the district court admitted a recording of the CARES interview over Roberts’ objection. In doing so, the district court found that the child was capable of making statements for medical purposes and that “there is little reason to doubt [the child’s] motivation in making the disclosures.” Both the child and Roberts testified at trial. Ultimately, the jury found Roberts guilty of both counts. Roberts appealed. Finding no abuse of discretion in admitting the CARES interview, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Roberts' judgment of conviction. View "Idaho v. Roberts" on Justia Law