Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In September 2018, Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) officers arrested Darren Temple in California as he crossed the border from Mexico into the United States. Temple had been in Mexico for legitimate business purposes, but CBP officers received a positive alert for his name from the National Crime Information Center indicating that Temple was wanted in Idaho on an outstanding warrant for lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor. Prior to his arrest, Temple had filed for a divorce from Jennifer Temple in March 2018. Then, in May 2018, Jennifer’s daughter, J.P., filed a report with the Canyon County Sheriff’s Office alleging that Temple, her then stepfather, had sexually abused her. Though J.P. did not report the sexual abuse to law enforcement for some time, she testified that she had told her best friend, her boyfriend, and her mother, Jennifer, immediately following the last incident of sexual abuse in late November 2014. After encouragement from her therapist, J.P. eventually reported the incident to law enforcement in May 2018. Two days after his CBP arrest, Idaho charged Temple with one count of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen. Under the case caption and case number of his criminal case, Temple served Jennifer’s divorce attorney with a subpoena duces tecum seeking “any and all documents related to the billing and payment records related to the representation of Jennifer Temple, to include, but not limited to the number of hours worked and the number of hours charged.” Jennifer’s attorney moved to quash the subpoena , arguing the requested records contained attorney-client privileged information and attorney work product. Temple did not respond to the motion to quash his subpoena. The district court granted the motion to quash, concluding the information sought was irrelevant and, alternatively, covered by the attorney-client privilege. Temple appealed the subpoena issue to the Idaho Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error in the decision to quash, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. Temple" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a family dispute concerning ownership interests in Nelsen Farms, LLC (“LLC”). The LLC, as originally established, included equal ownership for two of the Nelsen’s sons, Jack S. and Jonathan. However, in 2015, Jack H. Nelsen (“Jack H.”) and Joan Nelsen modified their estate plans and decided to pass their interests in the LLC to Jonathan via an inter vivos transfer, rather than through their wills. In August 2017, members of the LLC held a special meeting, during which the transfer of the membership interest to Jonathan was approved. The next month, Jack S., his wife and son, and Jack S.’s sister Janice Lehman, filed a complaint against Jack H., Joan and Jonathan alleging Jack H. and Joan were incompetent and lacked testamentary capacity to modify their 2015 wills and to make the 2017 inter vivos conveyance. Appellants also alleged Jonathan unduly influenced Jack H. and Joan to obtain the estate modification. Appellants amended their complaint in October 2017, adding a claim for dissolution of the LLC. The district court ultimately granted summary judgment to Respondents and dismissed all of Appellants’ claims. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court in all respects save one: dissolution of the LLC. To this, the Court held that when the district court granted dissolution on summary judgment, Jack S. was ipso facto deprived of his membership interest and relegated to the status of economic interest holder, without the right to petition for dissolution since, under the statute, only members could do so. Jack S. was reinstated as a member of the LLC, and had the right to seek dissolution upon remand. View "Nelsen v. Nelsen" on Justia Law

The State challenged a district court’s order denying a motion to exclude expert testimony that defendant-respondent Ruben Diaz lacked the mens rea to commit aggravated battery because he suffered from a mental illness or defect that caused him to believe the victim was not a person but instead an alien being from another planet. The State charged Diaz with aggravated battery, use of a deadly weapon in the commission of a crime, and resisting and obstructing a police officer after he stabbed a man in a random attack. The State filed a motion in limine to exclude Diaz’s expert testimony, arguing Idaho Code section 18-207 barred expert testimony on evidence of a mental condition. The district court denied: (1) the motion in limine; (2) the State’s subsequent motion to reconsider; and (3) the State’s motion for a permissive appeal. The State then timely filed a motion for permissive appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Idaho v. Diaz" on Justia Law

Lisa and Mark Weaver married in 2016, and had one minor child, A.W., born January 2017. In November 2020, The parties agreed between themselves to split physical custody of A.W. on a roughly 60/40 basis, with Mark having three out of every four weekends. Through court-ordered mediation, the parties resolved all issues relating to their divorce except for “physical custody, visitation, and child support.” Pertinent to this appeal, Mark argued a 50/50 split would be in A.W.’s best interest because it would allow A.W. to have more time with her father and give her more “stability and structure” compared to the temporary custody arrangements the parties had been using. Lisa’s major concern with Mark’s proposed arrangement was the time it would require A.W. to be in daycare when Lisa could provide care for A.W. at home. The magistrate court issued an oral ruling at the conclusion of trial that split physical custody of A.W. between the parties on a roughly 60/40 basis. The magistrate court indicated that its decision did not give either Lisa or Mark exactly what they wanted, but was what the magistrate court believed to be in A.W.’s best interest. Lisa moved the magistrate court for permission to appeal its custody order directly to the Idaho Supreme Court, which was granted. On appeal, Lisa argued the magistrate court abused its discretion in ordering a division of custody in which one parent had custody on almost every weekend. The Supreme Court concurred the magistrate court abused its discretion in awarding Mark physical custody of A.W. on almost every weekend, finding the court acted outside the bounds of its discretion and misapplied relevant legal standards in failing to adequately consider the statutory factor concerning A.W.’s interactions and interrelationships with her parents once A.W. started school. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Weaver v. Weaver" on Justia Law

Talon Ross appealed a district court’s order revoking his probation and imposing his previously suspended sentence for a robbery he pleaded guilty to in 2011. In 2019, Ross was charged with violating the terms of his probation by allegedly committing petit theft and injury to a child. At an evidentiary hearing on the probation violation allegations, the district court found that, despite Ross introducing a judgment of acquittal for the petit theft charge, the State had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Ross had committed petit theft. Additionally, the district court found by a preponderance of evidence that Ross had committed injury to a child. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s order revoking Ross’s probation and imposing his sentence. While the Idaho Supreme Court determined the district court did not err in concluding Ross committed the crime of petit theft by a preponderance of the evidence, district court erred in concluding Ross committed injury to a child by a preponderance of the evidence. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for a new probation violation hearing. View "Idaho v. Ross" on Justia Law

The issue this appeal presented for the Idaho Supreme Court's review concerned whether a prescriptive easement existed on a road accessing property owned by Shelley and Roger Cook near the Bingham and Bonneville County line. The Cooks’ property was originally owned by Shelley’s grandfather, John Harker, and stayed in the Harker family ever since. The Harker family (including the Cooks) claimed to have used what the parties called “Tower Road” to access their property for as long as the family can remember. Tower Road connected the Cook Property to a county road and ran through property owned by Jay and Shelli Van Orden. The Cooks filed suit against the Van Ordens claiming a prescriptive easement across the Van Ordens’ property via Tower Road. The district court ruled in the Van Ordens’ favor, holding that because the Cooks’ longstanding use of the land was not adverse, it did not have to address the remaining elements of a prescriptive easement. The Cooks appealed to the Supreme Court, contending the district court erred in finding their family’s use of Tower Road was with implied permission and in not addressing the remaining elements. The Supreme Court found the district court erred in granting judgment to the Van Ordens without determining the relevant statutory period for determining adverse use. Judgment was reversed and the case remanded for a determination of the relevant statutory period for the claimed prescriptive easement and whether the evidence established adverse use during that time. View "Cook v. Van Orden" on Justia Law

Aaron Tower appealed a district court’s order denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained following a warrantless arrest. In 2018, Tower’s mother, Michelle, contacted the Boise Police Department (BPD) and spoke to Officer Hilton to report that her son, Tower, had threatened to “blow his head off in [her] house.” The State also alleged that Tower posted on social media that he was driving from Nevada to Idaho with a plan to shoot Michelle and his stepfather. Michelle was out of town at the time. Tower’s grandmother, Sandra, was at home, however, because she was watching the house while Michelle was away. Michelle told Officer Hilton she was concerned for Sandra’s safety and said she did not want Tower on her property. Tower was charged with possession of a controlled substance and with resisting or obstructing an officer. Tower moved to suppress on the grounds the evidence was fruit of an unlawful seizure not based on probable cause. At the hearing on Tower’s motion, Dustin and Michelle both testified. Dustin testified to telling Tower he was under arrest for trespassing, and subsequently placing him under arrest for resisting and obstructing after Tower resisted Dustin’s efforts to handcuff him. Tower argued he was unlawfully arrested for trespassing without probable cause or a warrant, thus, the evidence obtained during a subsequent search should have been suppressed. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. Tower then petitioned the Idaho Supreme Court for review. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision denying Tower's motion to suppress because Tower did not properly preserve his argument on appeal. View "Idaho v. Tower" on Justia Law

The Idaho Industrial Commission appealed the dismissal of motion to renew a restitution order in a criminal case. The Owyhee County Prosecuting Attorney obtained an order of restitution against Malinda Poe in 2005, which required Poe to pay $2,346 to the Industrial Commission’s Crime Victims Compensation Program. In 2010, the Industrial Commission sought an order renewing the order of restitution, which was granted by the magistrate court. Five years later, the Industrial Commission sought another order renewing the order of restitution, which was also granted at that time by the magistrate court. In 2020, the Industrial Commission sought a third order renewing the order of restitution. This time, however, the magistrate court denied the request, finding that the Industrial Commission lacked standing to seek a renewal of the restitution order. The Industrial Commission appealed to the district court, which, sitting in its intermediate appellate capacity, also concluded the Commission lacked standing, and further concluded that the order of restitution was not subject to renewal pursuant to Idaho Code section 10-1110. The Industrial Commission appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. Poe" on Justia Law

Curt and Dara Von Lossberg filed this suit against the State of Idaho and the Idaho State Police after their son, Bryan Von Lossberg, ended his life with an unlawfully purchased handgun. The Von Lossbergs alleged that this purchase stemmed from failures in Idaho’s electronic case management system to properly report his mental health status. The district court dismissed the Von Lossbergs’ claims for negligence and wrongful death, concluding that the government defendants were immune from tort liability under the immunity provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (“Brady Act”). On appeal, the Von Lossbergs argued their case should not have been dismissed because: (1) the Brady Act’s immunity provision did not apply to the State of Idaho; and (2) the Brady Act’s immunity provision was not preserved by the Idaho Tort Claims Act. The Idaho Supreme Court concurred that the Brady Act did not grant immunity to the State and its agencies. Accordingly, judgment was reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Von Lossberg v. Idaho" on Justia Law

In 2017, Ronald Van Hook was declared a vexatious litigant pursuant to Idaho Court Administrative Rule 59; this declaration was upheld by he Idaho Supreme Court. In 2021, “on behalf of his minor son” G.V.H., Van Hook filed a 28-page “Request for Leave to File Habeas Corpus and Juvenile Post-Conviction Relief” (“the Filing Request”). In the Filing Request, Van Hook alleged eight sets of “complaints” and asserted that numerous fundamental rights had been violated. He further requested a hearing on the Filing Request. Without holding a hearing on the matter, the district court denied the request because: (1) Van Hook, as a non-lawyer, could not engage in the unauthorized practice of law by representing his son in a civil court proceeding; (2) the petition for writ of habeas corpus was without merit; and (3) Van Hook was attempting to re-litigate prior court decisions that had been finally decided against him. Van Hook appealed, and the Supreme Court entered an Order Conditionally Dismissing Appeal, which stayed the proceedings, but allowed Van Hook time “to make application with the presiding district court judge permitting the notice of appeal to be filed, pursuant to I.C.A.R. 59(j).” The district court granted Van Hook permission to appeal “the narrow issue of whether [the district court’s] decision to deny Mr. Van Hook’s motion for leave to file litigation was arbitrary and capricious and/or in violation of his due process rights.” The Supreme Court withdrew its conditional order, allowing appeal on the narrow issue identified by the district court. As a matter of first impression, the Supreme Court first determined the proper standard of review to apply when reviewing a presiding judge’s denial of a vexatious litigant’s request to file new litigation pursuant to Rule 59(i) was the same standard used when reviewing a district court’s granting of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6): “The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” The Court found the district court did not err in denying Van Hook's request for leave to file new litigation, and his due process rights were not violated. View "Van Hook v. Idaho" on Justia Law