Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Timothy Dacey was convicted by jury of Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”). He received a second offense sentencing enhancement. During his trial, the magistrate judge allowed Officer Jessica Raddatz, a trained drug recognition expert, to testify as a lay witness about the physical indicators that a person is on the “downside” from methamphetamine use. On intermediate appeal, the district court affirmed. Dacey argued the district court erred in affirming his conviction and sentence because: (1) the “downside” testimony qualified as expert witness testimony, which should have been disclosed in discovery; and (2) the magistrate court failed to conduct the appropriate analysis to determine whether this alleged expert witness testimony was admissible. Dacey also argued the district court on intermediate appeal applied the wrong legal standard in determining that any error was harmless. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in upholding the magistrate court’s ruling that allowed Raddatz to testify as a lay witness. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded this case to the district court with direction to vacate Dacey’s judgment of conviction and remand it to the magistrate court for further proceedings. The Court also announced that, henceforth, trial testimony from a drug recognition expert requires expert witness disclosure in accordance with Idaho Criminal Rule 16(b)(7). View "Idaho v. Dacey" on Justia Law

Douglas Waite appealed an Idaho Industrial Commission (“Commission”) decision requiring him to repay unemployment benefits he received, along with interest and penalties. Waite claimed the Commission’s determination that he willfully misstated a material fact for the purpose of obtaining unemployment benefits was not supported by substantial and competent evidence and was incorrect as a matter of law. Additionally, Waite argued the Commission erred when it concluded that Idaho Code section 72-1366(12) required him to repay the unemployment benefits he received. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s decision and order. View "Waite v. Moto One KTM, LLC" on Justia Law

Medical Recovery Services, LLC, (MRS) sued Michael Eddins to collect on debts that had purportedly been assigned to MRS by Intermountain Emergency Physicians and Intermountain Anesthesia. After a bench trial, the magistrate court dismissed MRS’s complaint, holding MRS lacked standing because it failed to prove a valid assignment occurred. MRS appealed to the district court. That court reversed, holding the magistrate court erred in limiting the admission of two exhibits that MRS relied upon to establish that Eddins’ accounts had been validly assigned to it. Alternatively, the district court held Eddins was judicially estopped from raising the assignment issue at trial because he did not raise it earlier during the litigation. Eddins timely appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. After review, the Court affirmed the district court’s decision on the magistrate court’s abuse of discretion in limiting the admission of "Exhibit 2." The Court likewise affirmed the district court’s conclusion about an agent of MRS and its standing for the purposes of prosecuting this case. The Court reversed as to all other issues and remanded for further proceedings. View "Medical Recovery Svcs v. Eddins" on Justia Law

In 2018, Marissa Dempsey was convicted by a jury of several counts of burglary, grand theft, and petit theft, after which the district court entered an order requiring Dempsey to pay restitution to the victims of the crimes. Dempsey appealed on three grounds: (1) her conviction on one count of grand theft should have been reduced to petit theft because conviction for grand theft required the State to prove the stolen property was worth more than $1,000, which she alleged the State failed to do; (2) the prosecuting attorney committed prosecutorial misconduct by making several improper statements during closing arguments that constituted fundamental error, thereby entitling her to a new trial; and (3) the district court erred in ordering restitution for several items stolen from the victims. With regard to certain jewelry, electronics, coin collections, and other property, Dempsey contended the district court erred because the State failed to present substantial evidence to establish the market value of the property at the time of the crime. Regarding restitution for the cost to replace a stock certificate and three certified marriage certificates, Dempsey argued the district court erred because the victim had not actually incurred the cost of replacing the documents before sentencing. While the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Dempsey's conviction on all counts, it concurred with her latter argument that it was error to order restitution for a stolen coin collection and perfume, and in awarding restitution for the replacement cost of stock and marriage certificates. View "Idaho v. Dempsey" on Justia Law

Kevin Cox was charged by information with attempted strangulation and intentional destruction of a telecommunication instrument stemming from the domestic abuse of his wife. The crime of attempted strangulation was a felony punishable by up to fifteen years imprisonment; intentional destruction of a telecommunication instrument was a misdemeanor punishable by up to one year imprisonment. Cox plead not guilty to both charges. The State then filed an Information Part II, alleging that Cox was a persistent violator under Idaho Code section 19-2514 because he had been convicted of three prior felonies. Conviction under section 19-2514 carried a sentence of not less than five years and up to life imprisonment, irrespective of the penalty prescribed for the underlying offense. Cox made no objection to the composition of the jury after it was selected. However, he was never asked if he passed the jury for cause, apparently due to an oversight by the district court after an interruption during voir dire. As a result, Cox never passed the panel for cause. The jury found Cox guilty on both charges and Cox admitted to being a persistent violator. The district court imposed a ten-year sentence with three years fixed for the attempted strangulation conviction, a concurrent sixty-day sentence for the destruction of a telecommunication instrument conviction, and retained jurisdiction. After a rider review hearing, the district court suspended Cox’s sentence and placed Cox on probation for ten years. Cox appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court found the district court erred in denying Cox ten peremptory challenges during voir dire. Idaho Criminal Rule 24 provided: “If the offense charged is punishable by death, or life imprisonment, each party . . . is entitled to 10 peremptory challenges. In all other felony cases each party. . . is entitled to six peremptory challenges.” Cox maintained he was entitled to ten challenges because this provision focused on the maximum possible punishment that a defendant could face if convicted, while the State maintained that the legislatively prescribed penalty for the underlying offense controlled, without regard to any potential enhancement. The Supreme Court concluded Cox was entitled to a new trial because, by this opinion, the Court adopted a new standard for demonstrating error from the denial of a peremptory challenge. Judgment was vacated and the case returned to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Idaho v. Cox" on Justia Law

The issue this appeal presented for the Idaho Supreme Court's review centered on whether Shelaina Neimeyer’s argument concerning judicial notice of a municipal ordinance was properly preserved for appeal. An employee at a gas station in Twin Falls, Idaho, contacted the police about a vehicle that had been parked at the gas station for over an hour. The employee reported that a woman who had previously purchased alcohol at the gas station (later identified as Neimeyer) had not moved from the vehicle for over 30 minutes. Consequently, Officers Tracy Thompson and Candace Comeau were dispatched at approximately 2 a.m. to conduct a welfare check. When the officers approached Neimeyer's vehicle, Officer Comeau then asked Neimeyer about a small, closed container on the passenger seat. Neimeyer initially refused to allow the officers to search the container, but she acquiesced, and the officers smelled the odor of marijuana inside. After Officer Thompson asked Neimeyer to exit her vehicle, she complied and took her purse with her. Neimeyer was placed in handcuffs and told she was being detained because of the alcohol found in her vehicle, the marijuana found in the container, and the possibility that she may be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Officer Thompson then searched Neimeyer’s purse and discovered incriminating evidence, including methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia. After Neimeyer was charged with possession of methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia, she filed a motion to suppress evidence, contending the district court erred when it denied her motion because: (1) the State did not prove the existence of a City of Twin Falls ordinance; and (2) the district court was precluded from taking judicial notice of a municipal ordinance. Because Neimeyer raised her argument concerning judicial notice for the first time on appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. View "Idaho v. Neimeyer" on Justia Law

Tomas Daniel Garcia-Ongay appealed his conviction for lewd conduct with a minor under the age of sixteen. After Garcia-Ongay’s conviction, the Jury Commissioner informed the district court of his concerns that a juror in the trial had expressed clear racial bias when he was summoned for jury duty. In light of this information, Garcia-Ongay moved for a new trial and requested that the district court grant permission for him to investigate whether racial animus tainted the jury’s deliberations. The district court denied the motion and the accompanying request. On appeal, Garcia-Ongay contended the district court abused its discretion in denying his request for further investigation, arguing that the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017), permitted such an inquiry. To this, the Idaho Supreme Court agreed: the district court abused its discretion in denying Garcia-Ongay’s request for post-trial juror contact because good cause existed to suggest that racial animus could have tainted the jury’s deliberations. Accordingly, the case was remanded to allow Garcia-Ongay to interview Juror #9 and, in the discretion of the district court, contact the other jurors to investigate whether racial prejudice infected their deliberations. View "Idaho v. Garcia-Ongay" on Justia Law

Daisha Maloney appealed her conviction for possession of methamphetamine. An officer with the Twin Falls Police Department stopped the car Maloney was driving after determining that the vehicle’s registration had expired. During this traffic stop, the officer asked if Maloney would consent to a search of the vehicle. She agreed. As Maloney and her passenger exited the vehicle, Maloney took her purse with her. The search of the vehicle yielded a “one-hitter” marijuana pipe which contained residue. The officer told Maloney he needed to search her purse, which was no longer in the car, based on what had been discovered in the vehicle. The officer found two pipes containing white crystal residue. Maloney was thereafter charged with possession of methamphetamine. Maloney moved to suppress the evidence found in her purse, which the State opposed by arguing that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement applied. Maloney contended that the automobile exception only applied to containers inside the vehicle once probable cause arose, and did not extend to her purse, which was outside the vehicle when the officers found the marijuana pipe. The district court agreed with the State that the automobile exception applied and denied Maloney’s motion. Maloney then entered a conditional guilty plea reserving her ability to appeal the suppression issue, and after judgment was entered, she filed a timely appeal. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed: once probable cause develops such that the automobile exception applies, officers may search accordingly. However, unless probable cause to search a vehicle has developed before a container is removed from the vehicle, an officer may not rely on the automobile exception to search that container. Because the State has relied exclusively on the automobile exception to justify the search of Maloney’s purse, the district court erred in denying Maloney’s motion to suppress. View "Idaho v. Maloney" on Justia Law

Edward Lee Gardner appealed after a jury found him guilty of the sexual exploitation of children over the internet. Over the span of a year, the Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force (“ICAC”) received downloads of suspected child pornography from an internet protocol (“IP”) address associated with Gardner’s home. ICAC executed a search warrant and discovered that Gardner was in possession of 771 images and 10 videos of child pornography. The State charged Gardner with eight counts of willfully possessing or accessing sexually exploitative material of a child, and two counts of knowingly distributing sexually exploitative material of a child. Gardner pleaded not guilty and requested a jury trial. After a three-day trial, the jury found Gardner guilty on all 10 counts. Gardner petitioned the Idaho Supreme Court to ask that his convictions be vacated and that he receive a new trial under several theories. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Gardner's conviction. View "Idaho v. Gardner" on Justia Law

Tenant Dennis Florer brought an action against Yar Walizada, his landlord, for breach of the warranty of habitability based on an alleged failure to provide an adequate heat source. Walizada moved to dismiss, asserting that Florer lacked standing to bring the action because, by the time Florer provided written notice under Idaho Code section 6-320, the alleged breach had already been cured. The district court denied the motion and, following a bench trial, entered judgment in Florer’s favor. Walizada appealed, arguing the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court found: Walizada rented a house without an adequate heat source to Florer; he had an obligation to provide an adequate heat source; he induced Florer to install the stove by promising to offset Florer’s costs against his rent; and he reneged on this promise. The Court found Florer could have sued for breach of the oral agreement to offset the costs of installation against his rent, and given the result below, it appears he would have been successful if he had. However, Florer brought suit under section 6-320, and this suit was not preceded by a written notice allowing three days to cure, the district court’s failure to grant Walizada’s motion to dismiss contradicted the plain language of section 6-320; therefore, the Court reversed its decision. View "Florer v. Walizada" on Justia Law