Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2010, Noell Industries, Inc. sold its interest in a limited liability company for a net gain of $120 million. Noell Industries reported the income to Idaho, but paid all of the resulting tax on the gain to the Commonwealth of Virginia, its commercial domicile. Following an audit, the Idaho Tax Commission concluded the net gain was “business income” pursuant to Idaho Code section 63-3027(a)(1) and, thus, apportionable to Idaho. Noell Industries sought judicial review before the Ada County District Court pursuant to Idaho Code section 63-3049(a). The district court ruled that the Commission erred when it: (1) determined that Noell Industries paid insufficient taxes in 2010; and (2) assessed additional tax and interest against it. The Commission appealed. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Noell Industries v. Idaho Tax Commission" on Justia Law

"Although seemingly a simple question of statutory interpretation, at its essence this case concerns a profound family tragedy that has left three young girls caught in the middle of a legal battle between four people who love them." The Nelsons were the grandparents of three girls, ages thirteen, eleven, and eight. The Nelsons’ daughter, Stephanie Evans, and their son-in-law, Brian Evans, are the girls’ parents. The Nelsons petitioned a magistrate court seeking to establish visitation rights, but the court dismissed the petition, ruling: (1) the Nelsons lacked standing to file a petition under Idaho’s grandparent visitation statute); and (2) even if the Nelsons had standing, it would still grant summary judgment in favor of the girls’ parents because the Nelsons would be unable to overcome the presumption that fit parents make decisions in their children’s best interests. On intermediate appeal, the district court affirmed the magistrate court’s rulings. The Idaho Supreme Court determined the visitation statute, Code section 32-719, did not restrict when a grandparent could petition for visitation rights. Further, the district court erred in affirming the magistrate court's grant of summary judgment to the Evanses because the Supreme Court found genuine issues of material fact as to whether the Evanses’ decision to terminate all contact between the Nelsons and their children was in their children’s best interests. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded to the magistrate court for an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the Nelsons' petition. View "Nelson v. Evans" on Justia Law

Britain Lee Barr pleaded guilty to five counts of sexual exploitation of a child and to being a repeat sex offender. The district court sentenced Barr to five, fifteen-year fixed sentences, to run consecutively to each other, for an aggregate determinate term of seventy-five years, reasoning that section 19-2520G left it no discretion to sentence Barr to anything less severe. On appeal Barr argued the district court abused its discretion when it failed to perceive that it had discretion to: (1) designate indeterminate and determinate portions of the mandatory fifteen-year sentences; and (2) run the sentences concurrently with one another rather than consecutively. Barr also claimed that if the legislature intended section 19-2520G to deprive the court of its traditional power to decide whether to run sentences consecutively or concurrently, the statute is unconstitutional. The Idaho Supreme Court determined Barr’s arguments were not properly preserved for appeal. Therefore, the Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. View "Idaho v. Barr" on Justia Law

David Glodowski appealed after he was convicted for failing to update his sex-offender registration in violation of Idaho Code section 18-8309. He argued the district court erred by ruling that his prior conviction under a Wisconsin statute was “substantially equivalent” to Idaho statutes that required sex-offender registration in Idaho. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court determined the district court improperly allowed the State to seek a redetermination of the “substantially equivalent” element given that the Idaho Bureau of Criminal Identification made a final determination on that element. However, because the State put forth sufficient evidence to prove that element, and the district court’s jury instruction accomplished the same purpose, the Supreme Court concluded the error was harmless. Accordingly, the Court found no reversible error in the district court’s decision to grant the State’s motion and provide the jury instruction. Therefore, judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "Idaho v. Glodowski" on Justia Law

Nicholas Blythe appealed after he was convicted of possessing a controlled substance. He conditionally pled guilty, reserving the right to challenge his sentence. On appeal, he argued the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress certain evidence found because the evidence presented at trial was found in violation of Blythe's Fourth Amendment rights. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court determined the search at issue took place before an arrest occurred, and because no rationale justifying a search incident to arrest was sufficiently present here, the search of Blythe’s shoes was not a valid search incident to arrest. Therefore, the district court erred in holding that the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Blythe's conviction was vacated, the district court order denying Blythe's motion to suppress was reversed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Idaho v. Blythe" on Justia Law

Timothy Jones was convicted by jury of trafficking heroin and possession of drug paraphernalia. On appeal, he argued the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence regarding his probation status, a knife found in the initial police search of his person, and that the trial court abused its discretion in arriving at his sentence. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Jones' conviction and sentence. View "Idaho v. Jones" on Justia Law

Richard Hess appealed an order of restitution entered against him following his guilty plea to trafficking heroin. Hess relied on the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in Idaho v. Nelson, 390 P.3d 418 (2017), to argue that there was insufficient evidence to support all but $1,500 of the award. The Court of Appeals reversed the restitution order, and the Supreme Court granted the State’s timely petition for review. The Court determined that $500 of the district court’s award of investigation costs was unsupported by the evidence. However, the district court correctly awarded the remaining amounts of restitution because: (1) Hess failed to preserve his foundational objections; and (2) substantial evidence supported the remainder of the award. View "Idaho v. Hess" on Justia Law

After Christine Nelson quit her job at Franklin Building Supply in Pocatello, Idaho, due to what she described as a hostile and demeaning work environment, she filed for unemployment benefits with the Department of Labor. The Department denied Nelson’s request for benefits, concluding that she quit her job without good cause because “reasonable alternatives were not exhausted prior to quitting.” Nelson mailed her protest via the U.S. Postal Service (“USPS”) from Pocatello, Idaho. Her letter arrived at the Department’s offices in Boise on March 7, one day past the deadline. Because the postmark did not indicate the date of mailing, Nelson’s protest was dismissed by the Department for being untimely. After a hearing, an appeals examiner concluded that although there was a USPS postmark stamped on the envelope, the red ink “blend[ed] with the red stamps,” obscuring the date. Thus, while the distribution center could be discerned from the postmark, “the remainder of the postmark [was] illegible.” Because the envelope lacked a date on the postmark, the appeals examiner concluded that the envelope should be treated as if it had no postmark at all, thereby making the date of filing the date received, which was March 7, 2019 - one day too late. Nelson timely appealed the decision of the appeals examiner to the Industrial Commission, arguing that the letter was mailed by March 1 and that she had no control over its late arrival or the absence of a legible postmark. The Commission concurred with the appeal's examiner. The Department of Labor nor the Industrial Commission considered Nelson's reason for appealing in the first place: that she lacked good cause to leave her employment. Focusing instead on the timeliness of her appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court determined the Department and Commission were mistaken in holding Nelson's filing was too late: "since once a letter is deposited for mailing it is entirely within the control of the USPS, the obscured date on the postmark stamp could only have been a result of USPS error. Thus, by the application of reason and common sense, the delivery of this letter on March 7—even with an illegible date on the postmark—conclusively proves that Nelson must have deposited her appeals letter into USPS custody on or before the March 6 filing deadline." The decision in this matter was reversed and remanded for consideration of the merits of Nelson's case. View "Nelson v. IDOL and Franklin Group" on Justia Law

Jesus Manuel Garcia was found guilty by jury of second-degree murder, aggravated battery, use of a deadly weapon during the commission of the former crimes, and possession of a controlled substance. The district court sentenced Garcia to an indeterminate life sentence with twenty-five years fixed for second degree murder, which included a sentencing enhancement for the use of a deadly weapon. The district court also sentenced Garcia to twenty years, with six years fixed, for aggravated battery; this also included a sentencing enhancement for the use of a deadly weapon. The district court further sentenced Garcia to three years fixed for the possession of a controlled substance conviction. All three sentences were ordered to run concurrently. In addition, the district court ordered restitution to the victims in the amount of $162,285.27. Garcia timely appealed, arguing: (1) the district court abused its discretion in allowing the State to present “in-life” photos of the victim and to elicit testimony about the victim’s personality and character during trial; (2) the prosecutor committed misconduct when she referred to this challenged evidence in her closing statement; (3) Garcia was deprived of due process because of the cumulative errors; (4) the district court abused its discretion in imposing a sentence that did not give proper weight and consideration to mitigating factors; and (5) the district court abused its discretion in ordering Garcia to pay restitution without adequately considering his current and future ability to pay restitution. Finding only that the district court abused its discretion in ordering restitution without proper consideration of Garcia's ability to repay the amount in the future, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed conviction, vacated the restitution order, and remanded for reconsideration of Garcia's foreseeable ability to pay restitution. View "Idaho v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Joanie Smith was employed by the Glenns Ferry Highway District (the District) when she witnessed the District’s office manager overpaying herself on several occasions. Smith reported the overpayments to the District’s superintendent. Sometime after Smith reported these overpayments, the District terminated Smith’s employment. Smith filed suit, alleging adverse employment action in the form of discharge. At trial, the trial court ruled it would use the jury in an advisory capacity concerning any front pay damages. The jury returned a special verdict for Smith, awarding her both back pay and front pay. Following the jury’s verdict, the trial court rejected the jury’s verdict awarding front pay, and entered a reduced award. The trial court reasoned that: (1) the jury’s verdict with respect to front pay was advisory because front pay was an equitable remedy when awarded in lieu of reinstatement; (2) Smith had not properly pleaded “failure to promote” as an adverse action in addition to discharge; and (3) the jury had incorrectly used an erroneous full-time employment status in calculating front pay. The trial court also reduced Smith’s requested attorney fees to an amount less than she had contracted to pay. Smith unsuccessfully moved for post-judgment relief. Smith appealed, and the District cross-appealed, arguing that the issue of back pay also sounded in equity, and that the trial court should have reduced the jury award of back pay. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court determined the trial court erred: (1) when it ruled that there was no right to a jury trial on the issue of front pay; (2) by refusing to include the adverse action of “failure to hire” in the jury instructions and special verdict form; (3) by failing to instruct the jury on the “risk of uncertainty” to be borne by the District in its determination of damages; and (4) by denying Smith post-judgment interest. The Court determined the "failure to hire" instruction and "risk of uncertainty" errors were not prejudicial, and the jury award of front pay should have been reinstated. Smith’s request for entry of judgment nunc pro tunc was declined; however, on remand the trial court was asked to determine whether judgment nunc pro tunc should be entered as of the date of the jury’s verdict. Furthermore, the trial court abused its discretion in reducing the award of attorney fees from the amount Smith requested. The matter was remanded for further proceeedings. View "Smith v. Glenns Ferry Hwy Dist" on Justia Law