Justia Idaho Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Francisca Gomez died as the result of a horrific industrial accident while she was cleaning a seed sorting machine as part of her employment with the Crookham Company (“Crookham”). Her family (the Gomezes) received worker’s compensation benefits and also brought a wrongful death action. The Gomezes appealed the district court's decision to grant Crookham’s motion for summary judgment on all claims relating to Mrs. Gomez’s death. The district court held that Mrs. Gomez was working within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident, that all of the Gomezes’ claims were barred by the exclusive remedy rule of Idaho worker’s compensation law, that the exception to the exclusive remedy rule provided by Idaho Code section 72-209(3) did not apply, and that the Gomezes’ product liability claims failed as a matter of law because Crookham was not a “manufacturer.” In affirming in part and reversing in part, the Idaho Supreme Court determined the trial court erred when it failed to consider whether Crookham committed an act of unprovoked physical aggression upon Mrs. Gomez by consciously disregarding knowledge that an injury would result. As such, the matter was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Gomez v. Crookham" on Justia Law

After Ellen Gittel Gordon defaulted on her mortgage, the loan servicer initiated nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings to sell her home at auction. Gordon submitted multiple loss mitigation applications and appeals in an attempt to keep her home but all were ultimately rejected. As a result, Gordon initiated the underlying action in district court to enjoin the foreclosure sale. Upon the filing of a motion to dismiss that was later converted to a motion for summary judgment, the district court dismissed Gordon’s action and allowed the foreclosure sale to take place. Gordon appealed. Finding no reversible error in the district court judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of Gordon's action. View "Gordon v. U.S. Bank" on Justia Law

In December 1995, Brian Trumble entered into a Career Agent’s Contract (“Agent Contract”) with Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho. Under the Agent Contract, Trumble was an independent contractor who procured insurance from interested buyers on Farm Bureau’s behalf. The Agent Contract included a non-competition clause. This case was about whether Trumble could collect service bonus commissions that were credited to him during his career, but which became forfeitable after his termination if he competed with Farm Bureau within one year of the termination. In addition, this case is about Farm Bureau’s counterclaims against the agent, alleging the agent misappropriated trade secrets and intentionally interfered with Farm Bureau’s prospective economic advantage after his termination. The district court held that Trumble forfeited his commissions by competing with Farm Bureau in violation of the one-year non-competition requirement. And the district court held that the agent was blameless for his actions after termination and dismissed Farm Bureau’s counterclaims. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court agreed, affirming the district court’s judgment dismissing the agent’s claims and the insurance company's counterclaims. View "Trumble v. Farm Bureau" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Idaho Supreme Court's review concerned an unjust enrichment claim brought by Kenworth, a commercial truck dealer, against Skinner Trucking, one of its customers. Kenworth claimed Skinner was unjustly enriched when Kenworth paid past due lease payments and the residual balance owed on Skinner’s lease with GE Transportation Finance. The district court entered judgment for Skinner on the grounds that, as to the residual value of the trucks, Kenworth had not conferred a benefit on Skinner, and that as to both the residual value of the trucks and the past due lease payments, Kenworth was an “officious intermeddler” because it had voluntarily paid GE without request by Skinner and without a valid reason. In a subsequent order, the district court denied Skinner’s request for attorney fees under Idaho Code sections 12-120(3) and 12-121. Kenworth appealed the district court’s judgment; Skinner appealed the district court’s order regarding costs and fees. The Supreme Court concluded after review: (1) the "officious intermeddler" rule was not an affirmative defense; the district court did not err in concluding Kenworth was an officious intermeddler; and (3) the district court did not err in determining that Skinner was not entitled to attorney fees under the circumstances. View "Kenworth Sales v. Skinner Trucking" on Justia Law

In 2013 and 2014, mother Jordain Bradford was involved in relationships with both Shad Hamberlin and Matthew Edwards. She did not marry either man. On September 24, 2014, Bradford gave birth to a minor child, T.J.H. Bradford and Hamberlin discussed the timing of her pregnancy and decided that Hamberlin had to be T.J.H.’s father. Bradford did not discuss the pregnancy with Edwards, nor were any additional objective measures, such as a paternity test, taken at that time. When T.J.H. was over nine months old, Bradford and Hamberlin each signed and notarized a Voluntary Acknowledgement of Paternity Affidavit (“VAP”), in which they both acknowledged that Hamberlin was the biological father of T.J.H. The State of Idaho then issued a birth certificate listing Hamberlin as T.J.H.’s father. Bradford and Hamberlin lived with T.J.H., generally in Bradford’s parents’ home, until around September 2016, when they separated. Hamberlin filed suit to establish child custody and child support for T.J.H. Bradford initially answered the petition by admitting, among other things, that she and Hamberlin were the biological parents of T.J.H. and that “both parties should have legal custody and joint physical custody of T.J.H. . . .” Bradford reversed course less than one month later, amending her answer to disavow that Hamberlin was a biological parent of T.J.H., and positing that Hamberlin should not have custody. Bradford amended her answer again in January 2017. This pleading continued to deny that Hamberlin was a biological parent of T.J.H., and affirmatively asserted that Hamberlin “has [no] legal right to have any of the care, custody and control of the minor child. . . .” Bradford also asserted for the first time, as an affirmative defense, that Hamberlin “is not the biological father of the minor child at issue in this matter.” The magistrate court rejected the mother’s effort to rescind the VAP and the district court affirmed that ruling. Bradford appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hamberlin v. Bradford" on Justia Law

The East Side Highway District (the District) and Gregory and Ellen Delavan (the Delavans) disputed the location of their common boundary relating to a portion of a road, Boothe Park Road, which included a boat ramp located on the shore of Lake Coeur d’Alene. The District asserted a claim to the disputed property under two theories: (1) a boundary by agreement that was established by the location of a fence that was erected by the Delavans’ predecessor in interest; and (2) Boothe Park Road and the boat ramp at its termination was a public highway pursuant to Idaho Code section 40-202(3). In response, the Delavans claimed the boat ramp was on their property, and its use by the public has always been, and remained, permissive. Further, the Delavans claimed the fence which was erected by their predecessor in interest was intended to act as a barrier, not a boundary. After two bench trials, the trial court ruled in favor of the Delavans, finding that the public’s use of the boat ramp had been permissive. As a result, the trial court ruled that the District did not have a right to a public easement based on Idaho Code section 40-202(3). Further, the trial court found that the fence had been erected as a barrier, not a boundary. Instead, the trial court found that the intention of the parties at the time the disputed property was conveyed to the Delavans demonstrated that the Delavans owned the property in dispute. The District appealed. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court held there was substantial and competent evidence to support the trial court’s findings that there was no boundary by agreement and that the Delavans owned the property in dispute. However, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the Delavans because there was no hostility requirement in Idaho Code section 40-202(3). Accordingly, the case was remanded to determine whether the District had a public easement under Idaho Code section 40-202(3). View "Eastside Hwy Dist v. Delavan" on Justia Law

This case arose out of the termination of Ryan and Lanie Berrett (“the Berretts”) from their jobs with Clark County School District No. 161 (the “School District”), and raised issues regarding the “law of the case” doctrine, the Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act (“Whistleblower Act”), and wrongful termination in violation of public policy. The Berretts sued the School District, alleging that both of their terminations were in retaliation for Ryan Berrett reporting a building code violation to the School District’s board of trustees (the “board”). The district court granted the School District’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Ryan Berrett did not engage in a protected activity under the Whistleblower Act, and that Idaho’s public policy did not extend to protect Lanie Berrett in a termination in violation of public policy claim. The district court also denied the Berretts’ motion for reconsideration. The Berretts timely appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded after review the law of the case doctrine did not preclude the district court from considering the School District’s motion for summary judgment, however, the Court erred in granting summary judgment on Ryan Berrett’s Whistleblower Act claim; the Court found genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Ryan Berrett engaged in a protected activity and causation. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on Lanie Berrett’s termination in violation of public policy claim. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Berrett v. Clark County School District" on Justia Law

Lamont Bair Enterprises, Inc. (“LBE”) was an Idaho corporation based in Idaho Falls that owned residential rental units. One of LBE’s rental units was a four-plex rental property at 547 South Skyline Drive (“the Property”), served by municipal water lines owned and maintained by the City of Idaho Falls (“the City”). On December 28, 2015, a municipal water main broke, causing water to flow beneath the Property’s driveway, crack the concrete basement floor, and flood the basements of all four rental units. The City received an emergency call for assistance in shutting off the water. Believing the incident to be a service line leak (as opposed to a water main break), the City’s response crew first closed the water service line and waited for confirmation that the water flow had stopped. After the crew received notice that water continued to flow into the basement, they isolated the leak to the water main and began repairing the main line. The water was turned back on the following day, and the road and curb were filled back in. None of LBE’s rental units ever experienced flooding from the city’s water lines prior to this flooding incident at the Property. LBE contended the water main “ruptured” due to negligent care (that “the City neglected its water system to the point that literally miles of pipe became past their design life and in need of replacement”) thus failing to exercise reasonable care in maintaining the water supply system. The district court ruled the City was immune from liability under the Idaho Tort Claims Act’s discretionary function exception. The Idaho Supreme Court determined the district court did not err in holding that the City is immune from suit pursuant to the discretionary function exception set forth in Idaho Code section 6-904(1). The Court did not reach the merits of the other issues LBE raised on appeal. View "Lamont Bair Enterprises v. City of Idaho Falls" on Justia Law

Andrew Maxim was charged with felony possession of a controlled substance. He appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress drug evidence found on his person after police searched the home he was living in without a warrant. The district court found that the exclusionary rule need not apply under the circumstances because the police would have inevitably discovered the heroin despite any alleged illegality. The dispositive issues on appeal were whether a probationer could object to a search of his home or person when he waived his Fourth Amendment rights as a condition of probation and whether the district court erred in its inevitable-discovery analysis. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed, holding that a Fourth Amendment waiver which is unknown to an officer at the time of a Fourth Amendment violation could not be relied on to assert that the search was reasonable. The Supreme Court also determined the district court misapplied the inevitable discovery doctrine by engaging in a speculative analysis that did not rely on an investigative path set in motion prior to or independent of the unlawful police activity. The district court’s judgment of conviction was vacated, the denial of Maxim’s motion to suppress was reversed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Idaho v. Maxim" on Justia Law

Katherine Lea Stanfield appealed a district court summarily dismissing her petition for post-conviction relief. Stanfield was a daycare provider with decades of experience caring for young children. In 2009, she was caring for her two grandsons and W.F., the two-year-old son of her daughter’s boyfriend. W.F. collapsed while in Stanfield’s care and was rushed to a hospital emergency room. Two days later, he was taken off life support and died. Stanfield’s daughter had personally observed W.F.’s father commit acts of abuse on W.F. She informed Stanfield’s lawyers of her observations. In addition, W.F.’s mother informed a police investigator that she had also witnessed W.F.’s father abuse him and implored the authorities to investigate him. However, Stanfield’s attorneys never elicited this evidence at trial. Nevertheless, in 2012, a jury found Stanfield guilty of first-degree murder committed through the aggravated battery and death of a child under twelve years old. Stanfield maintained her lawyers were ineffective in their failure to present that potentially exculpatory evidence. On appeal, Stanfield argued the district court erred in not granting her an evidentiary hearing on four of her claims. Because there were genuine issues of material fact presented in Stanfield’s petition, the Idaho Supreme Court vacated the district court’s summary dismissal and remanded so that Stanfield could be afforded an evidentiary hearing to determine whether her lawyers at trial were ineffective. View "Stanfield v. Idaho" on Justia Law